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tOUMBNT IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOOO 
r>t,*»~ * I(3a Joyce Wilson/ C
*£T NO. *'-"/£$ -
 C/> 
Plaintiff, ~--
v. 
The Industrial Commission of 
Utah, State Insurance Fund, 
and the Second Injury Fund, 
Defendants. 
Before Judges Davidson, Orme and Garff. 
DAVIDSON, Judge: 
OPINION 
Case No. 860160-CA 
RECEIVED 
MAYO'-
Brlgham Young University 
Law Library 
JRCB 
F I L E D 
APR 15 198? 
Timothy M. Shea 
Cferk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Plaintiff Ida Joyce Wilson appeals from an Industrial 
Commission denial of her Motion for Review of an administrative 
Order dismissing her claim for compensation for an industrial 
injury. We affirm. 
In September of 1984, plaintiff was employed as a cook for 
the Utah State School for the Deaf and Blind (School). On 
September 7, 1984, the School held a cookout for its staff and 
faculty. Mrs. Wilson and a co-worker Mrs. Dalpias, together 
with their supervisor Mr. Cobb, drove to Mrs. Dalpias' home to 
pick up a portable grill for use at the cookout. Mr. Cobb 
wheeled the grill to the curb prior to loading it onto the bed 
of the transporting truck. Mrs. Wilson testified that sie 
helped Mr. Cobb lift the grill onto the truck. Mr. Cobb a, d 
Mrs. Dalpias testified through written statements that Mr. Cobb 
alone did the lifting and the two ladies steadied the grill 
from their positions on either side. Mrs. Wilson stated she 
injured her back during the lifting but did not complain of any 
problem to her two companions other than to comment on the 
heaviness of the load. Plaintiff sought medical attention on 
September 20, 1984, because of problems with her legs but did 
not claim an industrial injury until December 4, 1984. 
Problems with her back became so severe she began taking 
accrued sick leave on November 28, 1984. She never returnee to 
her employment with the School. On December 19, 1984, 
plaintiff telephoned Mr. Cobb and reported that she believed 
her back injury stemmed from lifting the grill on the day of 
the cookout. This was the first notification of a potential 
claim to her employer. 
Medical documentation reveals Mrs. Wilson was treated for \j •". .* 
low back pain in 1978 and 1982. Both occurrences were prior to 0?: 
Mrs. Wilson's employment with the School. When questioned by ^t A. 
her chiropractor during consultation on September 20, 1984, ^^*r^.p 
Mrs. Wilson reported she had been in an automobile a'baiderit 
1/2 years previously and that her problem might have been 
caused by heavy lifting nine years earlier. Plaintiff left 
blank that portion of the chiropractor's Application for 
Treatment requesting information about the injury if it had 
been caused by an accident. 
Mrs. Wilson's claim for benefits was heard before an 
administrative law judge on June 13, 1985. The Findings of 
Fact did not deny that plaintiff suffered from low back 
problems but found that such problems were not related to an 
incident occurring during the course and scope of her 
employment with the School. The Order dismissing plaintiff's 
claim was entered on September 17, 1985. Plaintiff's attorney 
filed a Motion for Review with the Industrial Commission. That 
Motion was denied and the Order was affirmed. Plaintiff 
subsequently filed a Petition for Writ of Review. 
Plaintiff asserts that the administrative law judge should 
not have considered the written statements of Mrs. Dalpias and 
Mr. Cobb because they were unsupported by oral testimony made 
at the hearing. This assertion is incorrect. 
The record reveals that plaintiff's attorney stipulated to 
the admission of Mrs. Dalpias' written statement. To 
facilitate his questioning of plaintiff, it was that attorney 
who suggested the statement be admitted. The Court will not 
now hear objections to the admission and use of that statement. 
Mr. Cobb's written statement is also admissible even though 
the administrative law judge could have made Findings of Fact 
without it. Concerning the admissibility of hearsay evidence 
before administrative agencies, the Utah Supreme Court wrote: 
This Court has long recognized that 
there are significant differences 
between court trials and proceedings 
before administrative agencies and that 
the technical rules of evidence need 
not be applied before the latter. 
Hearsay evidence is admissible in 
proceedings before administrative 
agencies. However,, findings of fact 
cannot be based exclusively on hearsay 
evidence. They must be supported by a 
residuum of legal evidence competent in 
a court of law. 
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Yacht Club v. Utah Liquor Control Com'n. 681 P.2d 1224, 1226 
(Utah 1984)• See also Sandy State Bank v. Brimhall, 636 P.2d 
481 (Utah 1981); Schmidt v. Industrial Comm, 617 P.2d 693 (Utah 
1980). 
The record indicates that the Findings of Fact were not 
based exclusively on Mr, Cobb's statement. Absent that 
statement there was sufficient competent evidence to contradict 
the plaintiffs contentions. The reports of the several 
medical professionals are replete with references to earlier 
back problems and treatment as early as 1978, some six years 
prior to the incident involving the portable grill. The 
properly admitted statement of Mrs. Dalpias sufficiently 
supports the finding that plaintiff did not lift the grill in 
the manner she contends. 
There is no dispute that if the facts are as found by the 
administrative law judge and affirmed by the Industrial 
Commission, plaintiff is entitled to no recovery. In Utah 
Dept. of Admin. Serv. v. Pub. Serv. Com'n, 658 P.2d 601, 609 
(Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court wrote: 
Thus, in Williams v. Public Service 
Commission, 29 Utah 2d 9, 13, 504 P.2d 
34, 37 (1972), we held that Commission 
findings of fact will be upset by this 
Court only where they are "so without 
foundation in fact" that they "must be 
deemed capricious and arbitrary" 
(emphasis supplied). 
Recently, that Court reaffirmed this position stating, M[w]e 
give maximum deference to the basic facts determined by the 
agency, which will be sustained if there is evidence of any 
substance that can reasonably be regarded as supporting the 
determination made." Allen & Assoc, v. Bd. of Rev., Indus. 
Com'n, 732 P.2d 508 (Utah 1987). It is not necessary to 
belabor this issue in light of the evidence reflected in the 
record. 
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We find the arguments on appeal to be without merit, and 
the denial of plaintiff's Motion for Review by the Industrial 
Commission is affirmed. 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
R. W. Garff, Judge 
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